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Abstract 
 
This article examines the importance of understanding agent duties 
and conflicts of interest, both for drafting a power of attorney that meets 
a principal’s objectives and for providing guidance to the agent who will 
act under its authority.  Professor Whitton suggests that current custom 
and practice with respect to powers of attorney often overlooks the need 
to adjust agent duties to accommodate the principal’s expectations, thus 
resulting in inadvertent conflicts between the duty to do what the 
principal expects and default duties of loyalty.  The article offers 
practical guidelines for identifying and reconciling these conflicts, as 
well as best practices to improve the agent’s understanding of the 
authority granted in the power of attorney, the principal’s expectations 
for exercise of that authority, and the duties an agent must meet when 
carrying out the principal’s expectations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Powers of attorney typically make the news only when an agent has 
abused the principal-agent relationship.
1
  Given the importance of 
powers of attorney for incapacity planning,
2
 law reform has focused on 
statutory protections to prevent, detect, and redress abuse.
3
  The Uniform 
Power of Attorney Act (“UPOAA”)4 is the leading model for this 
reform.
5
  Far less attention has been paid to honorable agents and the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Kristen Doerschner, Power of Attorney Can Lead to Financial Abuse, 
TIMESONLINE (Sept. 15, 2012, 11:45 PM), http://bit.ly/ZalPJ3; Dennis B. Roddy, 
Courting Trouble: The Document Granting ‘Power of Attorney’ Often Leads to Abuse, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 2, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://bit.ly/146kxqd; Toddi 
Gutner, “License to Steal” from Seniors, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2006), 
http://buswk.co/Mkwih3. 
 2. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: 
Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter Whitton, 
Lessons Learned] (noting widespread use of powers of attorney in every jurisdiction). 
 3. See Linda S. Whitton, The New Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Balancing 
Protection of the Principal, the Agent, and Third Persons, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST 
ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING ¶¶ 900, 901.2 (Matthew Bender 
2007) (providing an overview of the UPOAA provisions designed to prevent financial 
exploitation as well as those aimed at detecting and redressing abuse). 
 4. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (2006), 8B U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 2012). 
 5. See Lori A. Stiegel & Ellen V. Klem, Power of Attorney Abuse: What States Can 
Do About It, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/Xo3XLs 
(comparing current state laws with the Uniform Power of Attorney Act).  To date, 14 
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act:  Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, U.S. Virgin 
  
2013] UNDERSTANDING DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1039 
guidance they may need to understand and perform their duties.  
Providing this guidance is essential because a power of attorney is only 
as effective as the agent who acts under it.
6
 
The lack of attention given to the agent’s perspective can be 
explained in part by the nature of the power of attorney relationship.  A 
power of attorney is generally the co-creation of the principal and the 
principal’s lawyer.  Appointing the agent is a unilateral act, typically 
completed by the principal without the participation of the person named 
as agent and possibly without that person’s knowledge.7  The principal’s 
lawyer likely will not have contact with the named agent until such time 
as the principal becomes incapacitated.
8
 
When a principal has lost capacity, the agent takes the principal’s 
place in the attorney-client relationship.
9
  The principal’s lawyer consults 
the agent as the principal’s appointed representative, but does not 
represent the agent as an individual serving in the agent’s role.10  If the 
agent has questions about duties and conflicts of interest, the principal’s 
lawyer may be reluctant to answer such questions for fear that the 
discussion could blur representational lines and violate the lawyer’s 
ethical duties to the principal.
11
 
Not only does the custom and practice with respect to powers of 
attorney seem to leave agents out of the loop, the law—common and 
 
Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Legislative Fact Sheet—Power of 
Attorney, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://bit.ly/16HGD29 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 6. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 10-38 (examining the role of the 
agent and discussing drafting and legislative reform strategies for optimal agent 
effectiveness and fidelity to the principal’s objectives). 
 7. Given the unilateral process by which an agent is named in a power of attorney, 
some type of acceptance is necessary to provide a reference point for when the agency 
begins and agent duties arise.  Under the UPOAA, “exercising authority,” “performing 
duties as an agent,” or “any other assertion or conduct indicating acceptance” is sufficient 
to establish that a principal-agent relationship has commenced.  UNIF. POWER OF 
ATTORNEY ACT § 113 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 2012). 
 8. Russell E. Haddleton, The Durable Power of Attorney: An Evolving Tool, 14 
PROB. & PROP. 58, 61 (2000) (describing the drafting lawyer’s dilemma when approached 
by an agent for advice after the client has become incapacitated). 
 9. See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as a Hedge Against Guardianship: 
Should the Attorney-at-Law Accept Appointment as Attorney-in-Fact, 2 ELDER L.J. 39, 
53-67 (1994) (discussing the importance of client-centered decision making in the 
attorney-client relationship and the role of the agent as the representative of the 
incapacitated principal). 
 10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2002) (stating, in 
pertinent part, that “[i]f a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, 
the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the 
client”). 
 11. See Haddleton, supra note 8, at 61. 
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statutory—provided little guidance to agents prior to the UPOAA.12  
Describing the agent’s role as “unscripted”13 and “uniquely 
directionless,”14 scholars urged law reform to set clearly articulated 
statutory standards.
15
  The UPOAA contains detailed provisions about 
agent duties,
16
 including the issue of conflicts of interest,
17
 but no 
scholarship to date has focused specifically on what agents need to 
understand about duties and conflicts of interest or how agents are to 
receive that information.  The purpose of this article is to explore best 
practices for drafting and client counseling to meet that need. 
Using the UPOAA as a model, Part I provides an overview of agent 
duties, distinguishing the mandatory duties that all agents must meet 
from default duties that the principal may modify.  The discussion 
highlights areas where agents may need more guidance if they are to 
understand their obligations.  Part II addresses circumstances where the 
duty to follow the principal’s expectations may produce inadvertent 
conflicts with the agent’s duties of loyalty.  Practical guidelines are 
offered for identifying and reconciling these conflicts. 
I. AGENT DUTIES 
An agent’s duties emanate from three possible sources—the power 
of attorney statute, the language of the power of attorney, and, if not 
superseded by statute or the power of attorney, the common law of 
agency.
18
  Under the first Uniform Act for powers of attorney—The 
 
 12. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of 
Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 4, 42-62 (2001) (pointing out “numerous 
ambiguities regarding the attorney-in-fact’s duties”). 
 13. Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of 
Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 584 (1996) (observing that “neither 
courts nor legislatures appear to have given much thought to the appropriate role of an 
agent”). 
 14. Boxx, supra note 12, at 44. 
 15. Id. at 44-46 (arguing that clear fiduciary duties are needed to compensate for the 
loss of monitoring function that accompanies a principal’s incapacity); Dessin, supra note 
13, at 602 (noting the lack of standards to govern the agent’s behavior). 
 16. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80-81 (Supp. 2012).  
“Section 114 clarifies agent duties by articulating minimum mandatory duties . . . as well 
as default duties that can be modified or omitted by the principal. . . .”  Id. § 114 cmt. 
 17. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80 (requiring the agent, unless otherwise specified in 
the power of attorney, to “act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the 
agent’s ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest”); id. § 114(d), 8B U.L.A. 
81 (“An agent that acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the 
principal is not liable solely because the agent also benefits from the act or has an 
individual or conflicting interest in relation to the property or affairs of the principal.”).  
 18. See id. art. 1 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 64 (noting that “[a]lthough the UPOAA is 
primarily a default statute, Article 1 also contains rules that govern all powers of attorney 
subject to the Act”); id. § 121, 8B U.L.A. 95 (providing that the principles of law and 
equity supplement the UPOAA); id. § 121 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 95 (explaining that the Act is 
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Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act
19—agent duties were not 
articulated and thus left for discernment from the common law of 
agency.
20
  The UPOAA Drafting Committee chose to enumerate specific 
duties because neither the common law nor existing state statutes 
provided a cohesive fiduciary standard for the power of attorney 
relationship.
21
 
Agent duties under the UPOAA fall into two categories—
mandatory and default.
22
  Mandatory duties set the baseline for agent 
conduct and may not be altered in the power of attorney.
23
  The default 
duties apply to agent conduct unless modified in the power of attorney.
24
 
A. Mandatory Duties 
Under the UPOAA, three mandatory duties set the minimum 
standard for agent conduct.  The agent must: 
(1) act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable 
expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, 
otherwise, in the principal’s best interest; 
(2) act in good faith; and 
(3) act only within the scope of authority granted in the power 
of attorney.
25
 
These fiduciary duties form the foundation of the principal-agent 
relationship.  Taken together, they in essence require that the agent act 
honestly within the granted scope of authority to do what the principal 
expects.  In theory, this mandate seems straightforward, but the 
 
supplemented by the common law of agency “where the provisions of the Act do not 
displace relevant common law principles”). 
 19. UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 233 
(2003). 
 20. See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest 
or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 943 (2005) (observing that because the Uniform 
Durable Power of Attorney Act does not regulate an agent’s duties, the common law of 
agency “sole interest rule” would apply to the fiduciary duties of such agents). 
 21. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 81-82 (Supp. 
2012) (noting that existing statutory standards for agent conduct varied widely from a 
“due care standard” to a “trustee-type standard,” and explaining that the departure of the 
UPOAA from the “sole interest test” of the common law “comports with the practical 
reality that most agents under powers of attorney are family members who have inherent 
conflicts of interest with the principal”). 
 22. See supra note 16. 
 23. See infra notes 25-68 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text. 
 25. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(a) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012). 
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following discussion will demonstrate why, in practice, agents often lack 
the guidance they need to perform their duties. 
1. The duty to act according to the principal’s reasonable 
expectations if known; and otherwise, to act according to the 
principal’s best interest. 
The mandatory duty to follow the principal’s reasonable 
expectations if known, and, if not known, to act according to the 
principal’s best interest, sets the general decision-making standard for all 
agent conduct.
26
  This standard reflects a public policy preference for 
surrogate decisions based on “substituted judgment” whenever that is 
possible.
27
  Commentary to the UPOAA acknowledges that “[t]he Act 
does not require, nor does common practice dictate, that the principal 
state expectations or objectives in the power of attorney.”28  Thus, the 
Act contemplates that expectations may be communicated informally. 
A power of attorney document in which specific expectations are 
stated creates a risk that the principal’s expectations will be frozen in 
time, binding the agent’s flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances.  Consider the following: 
 
  
 
 26. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (“Establishing the principal’s reasonable 
expectations as the primary guideline for agent conduct is consistent with a policy 
preference for ‘substituted judgment’ over ‘best interest’ as the surrogate decision-
making standard that better protects an incapacitated person’s self-determination 
interests.”). 
 27. Id.  Substituted judgment is the long-favored standard for surrogate health care 
decisions.  See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted 
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 758-59 (2012) (noting that the Uniform Health-Care Decisions 
Act prioritizes substituted judgment over best interest).  The standard was re-endorsed for 
guardian decisions by the Third National Guardianship Summit as Recommendation #1.5 
of the Overview of Guardian Standards, which provides: 
States should adopt by statute a decision-making standard that provides 
guidance for using substituted judgment and best interest principles in guardian 
decisions. 
 These standards should emphasize self-determination and the 
preference for substituted judgment. 
 The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act 
should be revised to embody these objectives. 
Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. 
REV. 1191, 1199.  
 28. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 81 (Supp. 2012) 
(observing further that “one of the advantages of a power of attorney over a trust or 
guardianship is the flexibility and informality with which an agent may exercise authority 
and respond to changing circumstances”). 
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Client Scenario 
 
Pamela, a conscientious lawyer, conducts a thorough 
interview with Douglas, a client who wishes to establish a 
substitute decision-making plan using a power of attorney.  
Pamela discusses the various types of authority that Douglas 
can delegate, including extraordinary powers such as the 
authority to make a gift or to create and change beneficiary 
designations.
29
  Pamela counsels Douglas about the benefits 
of a broad power of attorney as a hedge against 
guardianship.
30
  She also identifies the potential dangers of 
delegating authority that could alter his estate plan.
31
  They 
discuss at length the scope of authority needed to meet his 
needs and objectives.  In addition, Pamela stresses the 
importance of selecting a trustworthy agent and successor 
agent.  Douglas decides to name his wife as his initial agent 
and his 26-year-old son as his successor agent.  Douglas has 
two other children—a daughter who is 22 and a younger son 
who is 18. 
Douglas chooses to grant his wife the broadest possible 
authority.  He states that they share the same views about 
handling property and finances and that he implicitly trusts 
her.  Douglas wants his wife to have unlimited authority to 
make gifts and to retitle their property, for her benefit and for 
the benefit of their children.  He stresses that his wife must 
have authority to create and change beneficiary designations 
because they periodically make adjustments to their non-
probate distribution plan to offset differences in the financial 
support they give to their respective children.  Examples of 
past support include a down payment for their oldest son’s 
home, their daughter’s law school tuition, and the legal bills 
for their youngest son’s driving-while-intoxicated offense. 
Douglas is not comfortable giving his successor agent—
his oldest son—the same breadth of authority as granted to his 
 
 29. See id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97 (listing these and other actions for which an 
express grant of authority is required in the power of attorney). 
 30. “There is unavoidable tension in the question of how much authority to give an 
agent.  If the scope of authority is not broad enough, a guardianship may still be needed 
in the event of later incapacity; the broader the authority, however, the greater the 
potential for abuse.”  Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 19. 
 31. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 201 cmt. (2006), 8B U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 
2012) (noting the risk that accompanies delegation of authority for actions enumerated in 
section 201, but observing that “such authority may nevertheless be necessary to 
effectuate the principal’s property management and estate planning objectives”). 
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wife.  He states that his children do not know the exact level 
of financial support received by their siblings and that he 
wishes to keep that information confidential.  Douglas also 
mentions significant sibling rivalry between his sons.  
Although Douglas believes that his oldest son would rise to 
the occasion if he were needed to serve as Douglas’s agent, 
Douglas plans to postpone telling him about the appointment.  
Douglas views the successor appointment as merely a 
precaution against the unlikely event that his wife, ten years 
his junior, predeceases him. 
Douglas’s wife accompanies him to the follow-up 
appointment with Pamela.  Pamela explains that Douglas is 
her client and that she represents solely his interests.  
Douglas’s wife acknowledges the limits of Pamela’s legal 
representation, but adds that she and Douglas are “on the 
same page.”  Before Douglas executes the power of attorney, 
Pamela reviews the scope of authority with him and his wife. 
 
In the foregoing example, Douglas counts on the history of shared 
decision making with his wife to inform her future decisions as his 
agent.
32
  This history, plus Douglas’s implicit trust in his wife, supports 
Pamela’s drafting decision to forego memorializing his expectations.  In 
fact, reducing to writing all of the possible scenarios that might occur 
with the couple’s three children would be impractical and probably 
counter-productive.  The client does not wish to hamper his wife’s ability 
to respond flexibly to the changing and differing needs of their 
children.
33
 
The more difficult drafting and counseling challenge is posed by the 
possibility that Douglas’s son may someday succeed to authority under 
the power of attorney.  The son does not have a history of shared 
decision making with his father.  In fact, Douglas indicated that he and 
his wife have kept financial decisions confidential.  If the son succeeds to 
authority, how will he know his father’s expectations? 
Even where expectations have been communicated, if the principal 
loses capacity, the agent (or successor agent) will likely face decisions 
for which the principal left no specific directions.  Turning to the statute 
for direction, an agent may find more questions than answers.  Such 
questions include:  What does the phrase “reasonable expectations” 
 
 32. See Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s Impact on the 
Autonomy of Older Persons, 41 EMORY L.J. 773, 785 (1992) (observing that “[s]hared 
decision-making affords a chance for continuing dialogue that informs future proxies 
more fully about the individual’s values and preferences concerning later decisions”). 
 33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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mean?  Are specific instructions required or will the principal’s general 
objectives, values, and preferences suffice?  If no expectations can be 
ascertained about a decision to be made, does “best interest” mean a 
decision that is solely beneficial to the principal, or may the agent take 
into account the interests of others that the principal likely would have 
considered? 
These questions were explored by the author and Professor 
Lawrence Frolik in research conducted for the Third National 
Guardianship Summit.
34
  We were charged with developing a practical 
understanding of “substituted judgment” and “best interest” based on a 
review of scholarly literature, statutes, case law, and empirical data 
collected from our guardian survey.
35
  We found that notions of 
substituted judgment (i.e., doing what the incapacitated person expects) 
and best interest (i.e., doing what is best for the incapacitated person) do 
not fit neatly into two contrasting models.
36
  Instead, each concept is 
more accurately understood as providing a process for decision making 
along a hierarchical continuum, moving from “strict substituted 
judgment” at the top of the hierarchy (where specific directions or 
expressed wishes exist to guide the decision), to “strict best interest” at 
the bottom of the hierarchy (where no information can be obtained about 
what the person would want).
37
 
In between the ideal decision making circumstance of specific 
directions and the generic best interest inquiry of last resort, there are 
interim points on the hierarchy.
38
  When no specific directions exist, an 
expanded notion of substituted judgment permits decisions based on “the 
incapacitated person’s prior general statements, actions, values, and 
preferences.”39  If there are none, then the next interim point on the 
hierarchy is an expanded notion of best interest.
40
 
 
 34. See Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Introduction, Symposium, Third National 
Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157 (providing an 
overview of the guardianship reform history predating the Summit, the issues considered 
during the Summit, and the standards and recommendations adopted by the Summit 
delegates). 
 35. See generally Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-
Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491. 
 36. Id. at 1504-15 (synthesizing the spectrum of viewpoints on substituted judgment 
and best interest into five models). 
 37. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 750-57 (proposing the substituted judgment-
best interest continuum model for surrogate decisions). 
 38. Id. at 752 (illustrating the substituted judgment-best interest continuum). 
 39. Id. at 754-55 (noting that although “Expanded Substituted Judgment does not 
afford the degree of certainty that Strict Substituted Judgment does,” it facilitates a 
decision that is “a best estimate of what the incapacitated person would have done”). 
 40. Id. at 755-56 (observing that “[a]t times, evidence of what the incapacitated 
person would have done is too thin to support even Expanded Substituted Judgment”). 
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Expanded best interest permits decisions based on “the benefits and 
burdens for the incapacitated person, as discerned from available 
information, including the views of professionals and others with 
sufficient interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare.”41  Decisions 
based on expanded best interest could “also include consideration of 
consequences for others that a reasonable person in the incapacitated 
person’s circumstances would consider.”42  This expanded notion of best 
interest recognizes that individuals do not live in a vacuum.  Most have 
family members—for example, a spouse, children, and grandchildren—
whose interests would be considered if the individual were still able to 
make a contemporaneous decision.
43
  Some of the earliest substitute 
decision-making cases recognize consideration of such interests even 
where the incapacitated person left no specific instructions.
44
 
Based on our research, we proposed a revision to the decision-
making standard in Section 314(a) of the Uniform Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings Act.
45
  The purpose of the proposal is to clarify 
the decision-making process along this hierarchical continuum so that 
guardians have better guidance for making substitute decisions.
46
  In 
pertinent part, the proposed revised standard guides the guardian to: 
(1) act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable current or prior 
directions, expressed desires, and opinions to the extent 
actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or if 
unknown and unascertainable, 
(2) act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable prior general 
statements, actions, values, and preferences to the extent 
actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or, if 
unknown and unascertainable, 
(3) act in accordance with the ward’s best interest as determined 
from reasonable information received from professionals 
and persons who demonstrate sufficient interest in the 
 
 41. Id. at 751. 
 42. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 751. 
 43. Id. at 756 (advising care, however, that consideration of the interests of others 
“does not cross the line into exploitation . . . of the incapacitated person”). 
 44. See id. at 756 n.49 (discussing the seminal case of In re Whitbread, (1816) 35 
Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.), in which  the court granted a petition to increase the allowance of 
the incapacitated’s niece on the premise that a person in the circumstances of the 
incapacitated would prefer this outcome to the embarrassment of the niece’s poverty). 
 45. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), 8A 
U.L.A. 369 (2003). 
 46. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 27, at 758 (noting that the prioritization of 
substituted judgment over best interest in the proposal “is consistent with policies 
embodied in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and the Uniform Power of Attorney 
Act”). 
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ward’s welfare, which determination may include 
consideration of consequences for others that a reasonable 
person in the ward’s circumstances would consider.
47
 
Although the proposal is framed in the context of guardianship, the 
hierarchical decision-making continuum is also useful in the context of 
powers of attorney.  The drafting attorney could insert this language in a 
power of attorney to provide the agent with a process for decision 
making when the agent has no prior directions from, or shared decision-
making history with, the principal.  The goal is to guide the agent to a 
decision that approximates, as closely as possible, what the principal 
would have decided. 
2. The duty to act in good faith. 
The second mandatory duty—to act in good faith—is probably the 
easiest of the mandatory duties for layperson agents to understand.  The 
UPOAA defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact.”48  Applied to agent 
conduct, the duty of good faith does not require competence, but merely 
honesty.
49
  In fact, the Act permits a principal to exonerate the agent for 
incompetent performance provided the agent’s actions are not 
“committed dishonestly, with an improper motive, or with reckless 
indifference to the purposes of the power of attorney or the best interest 
of the principal.”50  In other words, an exoneration provision may not 
exculpate an agent for failure to act in good faith.
51
 
3. The duty to act only within the scope of authority granted in 
the power of attorney. 
The third mandatory duty—to “act only within the scope of 
authority granted in the power of attorney”52—presumes that an agent 
understands the meaning and limits of the authority granted.  The trend 
in modern power of attorney practice is to use statutory short forms or 
brief descriptive terms that incorporate by reference lengthy statutory 
 
 47. Id. at 757-58. 
 48. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 102(4) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 2012). 
 49. Honesty in fact represents a subjective standard, often described as “the ‘pure 
heart, empty head’ test of good faith.”  Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: 
A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 335, 381 (1988). 
 50. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 115 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2012). 
 51. Id. § 115 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 84 (noting that “[t]he mandatory minimum standard of 
conduct required of an agent is equivalent to the good faith standard applicable to 
trustees”). 
 52. Id. § 114(a)(3), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
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definitions of authority.
53
  This practice eases the drafting burden for 
lawyers and establishes accepted nomenclature upon which third persons 
can rely when conducting transactions with the agent.
54
 
The practice of incorporating authority by reference may be 
convenient for lawyers and those who deal with agents, but it leaves 
layperson principals and their agents with little to inform their 
understanding of the authority granted.  Even if the principal and agent 
read the statute (which is unlikely), the complexity for laypersons is 
daunting.
55
  An overview of the authority provisions in the UPOAA 
illustrates this point. 
The UPOAA distinguishes between areas of authority that must be 
delegated with express language
56
 and those that can be inferred from a 
general grant of authority.
57
 
An express grant is required for authority to: 
(1) create, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust; 
(2) make a gift; 
(3) create or change rights of survivorship; 
(4) create or change a beneficiary designation; 
(5) delegate authority granted under the power of attorney; 
(6) waive the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint 
and survivor annuity, including a survivor benefit under 
a retirement plan; or 
(7) exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority 
to delegate; or 
(8) disclaim property, including a power of appointment.
58
 
The requirement of an express grant for the foregoing powers is a 
precaution against inadvertent delegation of authority that could alter the 
principal’s property holdings and estate plan.59 
 
 53. Id. art. 2 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 97. 
 54. Id. art. 3 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 117 (observing that “[t]he familiarity and common 
understanding achieved with the use of one statutory form also facilitates acceptance of 
powers of attorney”). 
 55. Article 2 of the UPOAA, which sets out the authority provisions in the Act, 
comprises 17 sections of the Act and 9 pages of the Uniform Laws Annotated.  UNIF. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 201-17 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 97-116 (Supp. 2012). 
 56. Id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97. 
 57. Id. § 201(c), 8B U.L.A. 97 (“[I]f a power of attorney grants to an agent authority 
to do all acts that a principal could do, the agent has the general authority described in 
Sections 204 through 216.”). 
 58. Id. § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97 (brackets in original omitted). 
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Authority over all other subject areas may be delegated by a general 
grant.
60
  For example, the Act provides that a general grant empowering 
an agent “to do all acts that a principal could do”61 includes authority to 
act on the principal’s behalf with respect to the following: 
 
 real property 
 tangible personal property 
 stocks and bonds 
 commodities and options 
 banks and other financial institutions 
 operation of an entity or business 
 insurance and annuities 
 estates, trusts, and other beneficial interests 
 claims and litigation 
 personal and family maintenance 
 benefits from governmental programs or civil or military 
service 
 retirement plans 
 taxes62 
 
Nonspecific general grants “to do all acts that a principal could do” 
are not common in lawyer-drafted powers of attorney, but lawyers 
frequently use brief descriptive labels to incorporate areas of authority by 
reference.
63
  The UPOAA, which provides detailed descriptions for each 
area of general authority,
64
 offers an optional statutory form for this 
 
 59. See id. § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98.  The Act’s optional statutory form cautions 
principals about the potential danger of delegating these powers.  Id. § 301, 8B U.L.A. 
119 (including on the statutory form power of attorney the following notice to the 
principal:  “CAUTION: Granting any of the following will give your agent the authority 
to take actions that could significantly reduce your property or change how your property 
is distributed at your death.”). 
 60. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98. 
 61. See supra note 57. 
 62. These are the brief terms for areas of authority described in UPOAA sections 
204 through 216, UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 204-16 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 102-14 
(Supp. 2012), and are used to incorporate by reference those descriptions in the Act’s 
optional statutory form.  Id. § 301, 8B U.L.A. 118. 
 63. Section 202 of the UPOAA permits incorporation by reference by using the 
descriptive term for the subject area or citing to the statutory section where the authority 
is described.  Id. § 202, 8B U.L.A. 100.  The concept of incorporating by reference 
statutory definitions of authority pre-dates the UPOAA.  The Uniform Statutory Form 
Power of Attorney Act (1988) is representative of this approach.  UNIF. STATUTORY FORM 
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (1988), 8B U.L.A. 194 (2001); see also id. § 202 cmt., 8B 
U.L.A. 101. 
 64. See supra note 62. 
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purpose.
65
  Incorporation by reference may ease the drafting burden for 
the lawyer (and avoid lengthy power of attorney documents), but the 
short descriptive terms do not tell the layperson, whether principal or 
agent, much about the actual scope of authority granted. 
If the scope of authority is not clear on the face of the power of 
attorney, how is the average agent to understand what it means to act 
within that scope?  The practical response is that the agent needs some 
type of education.  Unfortunately, the typical manner in which powers of 
attorney are created may leave this need unmet. 
Consider again the example of Douglas, the client for whom Pamela 
drafted a power of attorney.  Pamela verbally explained the power of 
attorney to Douglas and his wife, but she did not provide them with a 
written explanation of the scope of authority.  An additional step in the 
representation—creating a separate explanatory document—could 
increase the likelihood that the agent and successor agent will understand 
what they are empowered to do if the power of attorney is later needed.  
Depending on the power of attorney, this separate document might be 
basic—simply restating the full statutory descriptions of granted 
authority,
66
 or more complex—noting areas of authority that have been 
added by express grant or modified in the power of attorney.
67
 
Such a document serves a dual purpose.  First, the drafting lawyer 
can review the document with the principal to confirm that the power of 
attorney contains the delegation of authority intended by the principal.  
Second, the lawyer or the principal can use the document to explain the 
scope of delegated authority to the agent.  If this discussion does not take 
place in the drafting lawyer’s office or between the agent and principal 
before the principal loses capacity, the explanatory document at least 
provides a means of self-education for the agent. 
A document that explains the scope of authority may also be 
required by persons who transact with the agent.  The UPOAA permits 
such persons to request, as a condition to accepting the agent’s authority, 
an opinion of counsel as to any matter of law concerning the power of 
 
 65. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 301, 8B U.L.A. 117-22. 
 66. For example, see the full statutory descriptions of authority contained in the 
UPOAA.  Id.  §§ 204-17, 8B U.L.A. 102-16. 
 67. As explained in the comment to section 201 of the UPOAA: 
[W]ith any authority incorporated by reference in a power of attorney, the 
principal may enlarge or restrict the default parameters set by the Act. 
With respect to other acts listed in Section 201(a), the Act contemplates that the 
principal will specify any special instructions in the power of attorney to further 
define or limit the authority granted. 
Id. § 201 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 98. 
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attorney.
68
  As a “best practice,” an opinion letter prepared at the time the 
power of attorney is drafted may be the most efficient and cost effective 
means of educating the agent and facilitating prompt acceptance of the 
agent’s authority. 
An opinion letter may be particularly useful in circumstances where 
the scope of authority granted to the initial agent is broader than that 
granted to the successor.  Consider again the example of Douglas who 
appointed his wife as his initial agent and his oldest son as his successor 
agent.
69
  He granted much broader authority to his wife than he granted 
to his son.  Douglas also contemplated not informing his son about the 
appointment until a later point in time.  If Douglas’s son has some 
awareness of the transactions conducted by his mother on his father’s 
behalf—such as making gifts or changing beneficiary designations—
might he not conclude that he too will have that authority as the 
successor agent?  This example illustrates why an opinion of counsel, or 
other explanatory document, should be considered a staple part of a 
drafting lawyer’s services.  Without the benefit of the drafting lawyer’s 
verbal explanation or an explanatory document, a successor may 
misapprehend the scope of his authority and have nothing to inform him 
otherwise. 
B. Default Duties 
Beyond the mandatory duties, the Act’s default duties also bind an 
agent unless the duties are removed or modified in the power of 
attorney.
70
  The UPOAA default duties require the agent to: 
(1) act loyally for the principal’s benefit; 
(2) act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the 
agent’s ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest; 
(3) act with the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily 
exercised by agents in similar circumstances; 
 
 68. Id. § 119(d), 8B U.L.A. 88.  An opinion of counsel might be requested, for 
example, when an agent presents the power of attorney to engage in a transaction 
somewhere other than the state in which the power of attorney was drafted.  Default rules 
with respect to agent authority can vary jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See Linda S. 
Whitton, Crossing State Lines with Durable Powers, 17 PROB. & PROP. 28 (2003).  For 
example, authority with respect to insurance transactions might include, in one 
jurisdiction, the ability to create or change beneficiary designations, while, in a UPOAA 
jurisdiction, an express grant of specific authority would be required.  UNIF. POWER OF 
ATTORNEY ACT § 201(a), 8B U.L.A. 97. 
 69. See supra pp. 1043-44 (client scenario). 
 70. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (noting that the 
principal may modify or omit default duties). 
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(4) keep a record of all receipts, disbursements, and transactions 
made on behalf of the principal; 
(5) cooperate with a person that has authority to make health-care 
decisions for the principal to carry out the principal’s 
reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the 
agent and, otherwise, act in the principal’s best interest; and 
(6) attempt to preserve the principal’s estate plan, to the extent 
actually known by the agent, if preserving the plan is 
consistent with the principal’s best interest based on all 
relevant factors, including: 
(a) the value and nature of the principal’s property; 
 
(b) the principal’s foreseeable obligations and need for 
maintenance; 
 
(c) minimization of taxes, including income, estate, 
inheritance, generation-skipping transfer, and gift taxes; 
and 
 
(d) eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a 
statute or regulation.
71
 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the Act acknowledges an agent’s duty to 
account (i.e., “disclose receipts, disbursements, or transactions conducted 
on behalf of the principal”) but limits the persons who can request this 
information.
72
 
Most of the default duties have a direct correlate in the common law 
of agency—acting loyally73 and with care, competence, and diligence;74 
avoiding conflicts of interest;
75
 keeping records and accounting for 
transactions.
76
  The other two default duties—cooperation with the 
principal’s health-care agent and preservation of the principal’s estate 
 
 71. Id. § 114(b), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 72. Id. § 114(h), 8B U.L.A. 81.  An agent must only disclose information if “ordered 
by a court or requested by the principal, a guardian, a conservator, another fiduciary 
acting for the principal, a governmental agency having authority to protect the welfare of 
the principal, or, upon the death of the principal, by the personal representative or 
successor in interest to the principal’s estate.”  Id.  This duty is also subject to 
modification by the principal because the full statutory provision begins with the phrase 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the power of attorney.”  See id. art. 1 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 
64 (noting that “the default provisions are clearly indicated by signals such as ‘unless the 
power of attorney otherwise provides,’ or ‘except as otherwise provided in the power of 
attorney’; “[t]hese signals alert the draftsperson to options for enlarging or limiting the 
Act’s default terms”). 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
 74. Id. § 8.08. 
 75. Id. §§ 8.02, 8.03. 
 76. Id. § 8.12. 
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plan—may be viewed as an outgrowth of the common law duty to follow 
a principal’s instructions,77 but they are duties crafted specifically for the 
personal power of attorney relationship.
78
  Their purpose is to “protect 
the principal’s previously-expressed choices.”79 
Under the common law, agent duties are distinguished as either 
“duties of loyalty” or “duties of performance.”80  Applying this 
distinction to the default duties under the UPOAA, two are duties of 
loyalty:  the duty to “act loyally for the principal’s benefit”81 and the duty 
to “act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the agent’s 
ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest.”82  All of the 
remaining default duties are duties of performance.
83
 
The advisability of removing or modifying the default duties will 
depend on a principal’s individual circumstances.84  For example, if the 
principal anticipates that contentious family members will challenge the 
agent’s conduct, an exoneration provision may be considered to reduce 
the agent’s liability exposure (thus overriding the default duty to act with 
“care, competence, and diligence”).85  If the principal prefers not to 
disclose the estate plan to the agent, or places a higher priority on inter 
vivos use of assets than post mortem distribution, the principal may 
choose to relieve the agent of the duty to preserve the principal’s estate 
plan.
86
  In situations where the principal intends the agent to use property 
for the benefit of the agent (e.g., paying tuition costs for the agent or the 
agent’s children), a partial override of the default duties to act loyally 
and avoid conflicts of interest may be necessary.
87
  The following Part 
 
 77. Id. § 8.09. 
 78. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81-82. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 8 (distinguishing duties of loyalty in 
Title B from duties of performance in Title C); Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (discussing the distinction between duties of loyalty and 
duties of performance). 
 81. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 82. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 83. See id. §§ 114(b)(3)-(b)(6), (h), 8B U.L.A. 80-81 (providing for duties of care, 
competence, and diligence; record keeping; cooperation with the principal’s health care 
agent; preservation of the principal’s estate plan; and the duty to account). 
 84. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81-82. 
 85. See id. § 115 & cmt., 8B U.L.A. 83-84. 
 86. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, supra note 2, at 28-29 (noting that “the principal 
has no affirmative obligation to disclose to an agent any information about the principal’s 
property or estate plan”). 
 87. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 81 (noting that “[i]f a 
principal’s expectations potentially conflict with a default duty under the Act, then stating 
the expectations in the power of attorney, or altering the default rule to accommodate the 
expectations, or both, is advisable”). 
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discusses at greater length the interplay of a principal’s expectations with 
agent duties and conflicts of interest. 
II. RECONCILING CONFLICTING DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The UPOAA’s distinction between mandatory and default duties 
provides drafting options for the principal’s lawyer,88 but, to choose 
among them, the drafting lawyer must determine whether the agent’s 
duty to follow the principal’s expectations (a mandatory duty) could 
produce inadvertent conflicts with the agent’s duties of loyalty (default 
duties).  In order to identify needed drafting adjustments, the principal’s 
lawyer must gather information about the principal’s objectives and any 
pre-existing conflicts of interest with the intended agent.  The following 
discussion suggests an analysis for determining, based on that 
information, where drafting adjustments in the power of attorney should 
be made. 
This discussion is divided into two sections.  The first examines the 
treatment of conflicts of interest under the UPOAA and how that 
treatment differs from the common law.  The second section looks at 
circumstances in which the agent’s mandatory duty to follow the 
principal’s reasonable expectations may cause inadvertent conflicts with 
the default duties of loyalty (i.e., the duty to “act loyally for the 
principal’s benefit,”89 and the duty to “act so as not to create a conflict of 
interest that impairs the agent’s ability to act impartially in the 
principal’s best interest”90).  Practical guidelines will be offered for 
identifying and reconciling these conflicts. 
A. The UPOAA Approach to Conflicts of Interest 
The commentary to the UPOAA acknowledges that inherent 
conflicts of interest are common when family members serve as agents.
91
  
Examples include circumstances where the agent will inherit whatever is 
not expended by the agent on the principal’s behalf and where the 
principal and agent co-own real estate or business interests.
92
  Where 
inherent conflicts exist, the agent needs to know whether conduct that is 
 
 88. See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance 
Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 345-51 (2008) [hereinafter 
Whitton, Autonomy and Protection] (describing how flexibility in tailoring delegated 
authority and the guidelines for agent conduct facilitates implementation of the 
principal’s objectives). 
 89. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012). 
 90. Id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 91. Id. § 114 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 82. 
 92. Id. 
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mutually beneficial to the principal and the agent is consistent with the 
agent’s duty of loyalty. 
Under the UPOAA, that question is answered by the following 
provision: 
An agent that acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best 
interest of the principal is not liable solely because the agent also 
benefits from the act or has an individual or conflicting interest in 
relation to the property or affairs of the principal.
93
 
In other words, a conflict of interest or an action that creates a benefit for 
the agent is not a per se violation of the agent’s duty of loyalty provided 
the agent acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest 
of the principal. 
Referring back to the client scenario in Part I, suppose that Douglas 
and his son share co-ownership of rental property.  His son is now acting 
as the successor agent and learns of a lucrative opportunity to sell the 
property.  The son has verified that the purchase price exceeds fair 
market value and believes the sale is in Douglas’s best interest because 
funds are needed to pay for his rising medical costs.  In this 
circumstance, the UPOAA would protect the son against breach of duty 
claims by his siblings because he acted with care, competence, and 
diligence for the best interest of the principal.
94
  Suppose, however, that 
the son was in deep debt and needed a quick cash infusion.  If he sells the 
rental property at less than fair market value so that he can salvage his 
finances, the UPOAA provision would not protect him (i.e., he did not 
act with care, competence, and diligence, and the below-market price 
was not in his father’s best interest).  If under different circumstances, 
however, the below-market sale was necessitated to meet Douglas’s 
medical bills, the son’s decision would likely withstand scrutiny as a 
diligent effort to do what was best for the principal. 
The result under the common law in a mutual benefit or conflict of 
interest situation is more complicated.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Agency provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a 
duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all 
matters connected with his agency.”95  By contrast, the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency provides that “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.”96  The Reporter’s note to this section explains: 
 
 93. Id. § 114(d), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 94. Id. 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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In this Restatement, § 8.06 addresses on a comprehensive basis the 
circumstances under which a principal may consent to conduct by an 
agent that would otherwise constitute a breach of the agent’s 
fiduciary duty.  This Restatement also formulates the agent’s duty as 
one to act “loyally” for the principal’s benefit.  This terminology is 
intended to clarify that an agent’s loyal service to the principal may, 
concurrently, be beneficial to the agent.
97
 
The Reporter’s note seems to suggest that the principal’s consent is 
necessary to deem as “loyal” agent conduct that would otherwise breach 
the duty of loyalty because it produced a benefit for the agent. 
In her article, Disloyal Agents,
98
 Professor Deborah A. DeMott, 
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, writes the following 
about principal consent to otherwise “disloyal” agent conduct: 
A principal may consent to conduct by the agent that would 
otherwise breach a duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the principal’s 
consent, the agent must act in good faith and fully disclose material 
information to the principal.  Although open-ended advance consents 
to disloyal conduct are not effective, the fact that a principal may 
consent to conduct that would otherwise breach an agent’s duties of 
loyalty mitigates the stringency associated with the fiduciary regime 
and other consequences that follow breach. . . .
99
 
Professor DeMott goes on to observe that the common law doctrine of 
loyalty is “prophylactic” in that “a breach of a duty of loyalty triggers 
remedies and other consequences, distinct from whether the person 
protected by the duty can establish that the breach in fact led to injury or 
in fact stemmed from disloyal motives on the part of the fiduciary.”100  In 
other words, under the common law, an agent with a conflict of interest, 
or who receives a benefit without the principal’s consent, faces liability 
for breach of the duty of loyalty, even if the agent’s benefit did not injure 
the principal. 
The departure of the UPOAA from the common law is justified on 
two grounds.  First, as previously noted, many family member agents 
have inherent conflicts of interest.
101
  Second, a durable power of 
attorney, unlike a common law agency relationship, continues 
notwithstanding the principal’s incapacity.102  Thus, an incapacitated 
 
 97. Id. § 8.01 rptr. n. a. 
 98. DeMott, supra note 80. 
 99. Id. at 1052-53 (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 1057. 
 101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 102. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 104 (2006), 8B U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 2012) 
(creating a presumption of durability for powers of attorney). 
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principal cannot give prior consent nor ratify a transaction in which the 
agent has a conflict of interest or might receive a benefit.
103
 
Although the UPOAA protects the agent who receives a mutual 
benefit or has a conflict of interest, provided the agent acts in the 
principal’s best interest,104 that protection may not go far enough in all 
circumstances.  What if the principal expects the agent to continue a 
pattern of annual exclusion gifts to the agent and other family members, 
or to spend the principal’s assets for the agent’s living expenses or 
tuition?  The agent will argue that such expenditures were made in 
conformance with the principal’s expectations, but the agent cannot 
argue that the expenditures serve the principal’s best interest.105  Without 
drafting adjustments in the power of attorney, the agent’s mandatory 
duty to follow the principal’s expectations is at odds with the default 
duties of loyalty.  The following discussion offers practical guidelines for 
reconciling these duties when they conflict. 
B. Reconciling the Mandatory Duty to Follow the Principal’s 
Expectations with the Default Duties of Loyalty 
The UPOAA offers great flexibility for tailoring an agent’s 
authority to meet the principal’s needs.106  Setting the scope of 
authority—the what of the authorization—is a separate issue, however, 
from the principal’s expectations for how the authority is to be exercised.  
If these expectations are known, the agent has a mandatory duty to 
follow them.
107
 
Conflicts in agent duties may arise when the principal expects the 
agent to use the principal’s property in a way that would violate the 
agent’s default duties to act loyally108 and avoid conflicts of interest.109  
Consider again the example of Douglas, who wanted his wife to have 
unfettered authority to use his property for her own benefit and the 
benefit of their children.
110
  If this expectation were stated on the face of 
the power of attorney, by implication it would override the default duties 
 
 103. See Whitton, Lessons Learned, note 2, at 24-25 (explaining why statutory 
protection is necessary for the agent who has an inherent conflict of interest and is 
serving under a durable power of attorney). 
 104. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 
2012). 
 105. See generally DeMott, supra note 80. 
 106. See generally Whitton, Autonomy and Protection, supra note 88. 
 107. See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text. 
 108. See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(1), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 109. See id. § 114(b)(2), 8B U.L.A. 80. 
 110. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
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of loyalty.
111
  If, however, the power of attorney neither states the 
expectations nor modifies the duties of loyalty, Douglas’s wife risks that 
her actions as agent are vulnerable to attack. 
Failure to draft for the conflict in agent duties (i.e., the conflict 
between the mandatory duty to follow the principal’s expectations and 
the default duties of loyalty) burdens the agent with a potential risk of 
liability.  This risk may also undermine the smooth operation of the 
power of attorney if the agent is reluctant to follow the principal’s 
expectations for fear of incurring liability. 
An inadvertent conflict in duties may also occur where the agent has 
a conflict of interest or may receive a mutual benefit from transactions 
with the principal’s property interests.  Assuming that the agent is bound 
by the default duties of loyalty in the Act, the agent with a conflict of 
interest is protected only if action on behalf of the principal is taken with 
care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the principal.
112
  
What if a principal does not expect the agent to act in the principal’s best 
interest with respect to co-owned property, but fails to express this 
expectation in the power of attorney or to modify the agent’s duties of 
loyalty? 
Consider again the example of Douglas who appointed his oldest 
son as his successor agent.  Suppose that the rental property, titled in 
both of their names, was actually intended as a gift to the son.  Douglas’s 
name remained on the title so that his son could obtain better mortgage 
interest and insurance rates.  If the oldest son needs money and uses his 
authority to sell the property quickly, at below market value, his siblings 
may feel justified challenging his conduct as a breach of his duties of 
loyalty.  In this scenario, the power of attorney did not adjust the default 
duties of loyalty, and the oldest son will have no proof of his now 
incapacitated father’s expectations. 
The foregoing examples illustrate common circumstances in which 
an agent’s mandatory duty to act according to the principal’s 
expectations could conflict with the default duties of loyalty.  How can 
the drafting lawyer anticipate such conflicts and create a power of 
attorney that is effective to achieve the principal’s goals without 
exposing the honorable agent to inadvertent risk? 
 
 111. Stating expectations in the power of attorney that are inconsistent with one or 
more default duties is a means of “providing otherwise” in the power of attorney.  See 
supra note 72 (discussing the portion of UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT art. 1 cmt. that 
addresses default rules in the UPOAA); supra note 87 (advising that, when the principal’s 
expectations conflict with the agent’s default duties, either the expectations must be 
stated in the power of attorney, the default duties must be modified, or both). 
 112. UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012). 
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A two-step analysis provides the answer.  First, the drafting attorney 
should determine from the client interview whether the principal intends 
the agent to act in a manner that diverges from an objective view of the 
principal’s “best interest.”113  Examples include making gifts or 
providing other types of support to the agent from the principal’s 
property.  Second, if the answer to this determination is yes, the client 
must choose between (1) explicitly stating the expectations in the power 
of attorney, thus cancelling by implication the default duties of loyalty
114
 
and (2) modifying the duties of loyalty in the power of attorney without 
explicitly stating the expectations, thus allowing those expectations to 
remain flexible.
115
  Although the drafting attorney may be reluctant to 
recommend modification of the default duties of loyalty, which reduces 
certain protections for the principal,
116
 the internal tension between these 
duties and the principal’s expectations cannot be ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
Current practice with respect to powers of attorney falls short of 
adequately guiding the honorable agent who wants to “do right” by the 
principal.  Agents need a clear understanding of their authority and how 
the principal wishes them to exercise that authority.  The failure to 
communicate these parameters may undermine the principal’s objectives 
and lead to an agent’s inadvertent breach of duties. 
Agents may have difficulty understanding their authority due to the 
cryptic labels commonly used on short form powers of attorney.  
Preparation of an opinion of counsel or other explanatory document to 
accompany the power of attorney should be an encouraged best practice 
in the power of attorney drafting process.  An explanatory document will 
help ensure that the principal, agent, and persons who deal with the agent 
understand exactly what is delegated.  This understanding is essential for 
the agent’s compliance with the mandatory duty to act only within the 
scope of authority granted in the power of attorney. 
Agents may also lack understanding of other duties and how to 
reconcile conflicting duties and conflicts of interest.  The UPOAA 
requires an agent to act according to the principal’s reasonable 
expectations if known and otherwise in the principal’s best interest.  If 
the principal expects the agent to act in a manner that may not comport 
 
 113. See generally DeMott, supra note 80 (discussing the stringent common law 
view). 
 114. See supra note 111. 
 115. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
 116. See generally Whitton, Autonomy and Protection, supra note 88 (discussing the 
inherent tension between drafting for the principal’s autonomy and the principal’s 
protection). 
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with the principal’s best interest, such as using the principal’s property 
for the support of the agent (a common expectation for family member 
agents), the principal’s expectations will likely conflict with the agent’s 
default duties of loyalty.  The vigilant drafting lawyer should conduct a 
thorough client interview to identify the principal’s expectations as well 
as potential conflicting duties and conflicts of interest.  Armed with this 
information, the lawyer can make appropriate drafting adjustments in the 
power of attorney.  Failure to do so may expose the agent to inadvertent 
risk and undermine the effectiveness of the principal’s power of attorney. 
 
